

The ARYAN PATH

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ORGAN OF THE INDIAN INSTITUTE OF WORLD CULTURE

Editor: SOPHIA WADIA

Assistant Editor: RAMESHCHANDRA SIRKAR

ADDRESSES

Editorial Office: "THEOSOPHY HALL"
40, New Marine Lines
Bombay 1

Managerial Office: No. 1/1, Bugle Rock Road
Basavangudi
Bangalore 4

London Office: 62, Queen's Gardens
London, W. 2

Indian Institute of World Culture: No. 6, Shri B. P. Wadia Road
Basavangudi
Bangalore 4

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THE ARYAN PATH

Point out the "Way" — however dimly, and lost among the host — as does the evening star to those who tread their path in darkness.

—The Voice of the Silence

VOL. XXXIV OCTOBER 1963 No. 10

IN MEMORIAM: SHRI B. P. WADIA

[THE 20th of August was the anniversary of the passing of Shri B. P. Wadia; the 8th of October is the anniversary of his birth. We dedicate to his memory the publication of the Founder's Day Address delivered by **Dr. D. V. Gundappa, D.Litt.,** at the Indian Institute of World Culture, Bangalore, on 20 August 1963. Padmashri Smt. Sophia Wadia welcomed Dr. Gundappa, whose distinction in both public affairs and philosophy needs no particularizing. Sir C. P. Ramaswamy Aiyar had sent a note of tribute to the late Shri Wadia's memory, in which he spoke of his own acquaintance with Shri Wadia and Shri Wadia's labours in the cause of Theosophy and the education of the public mind.

A memorial meeting was also held in Bombay on the same day, at which Professor G. C. Bannerjee spoke also on "Unity Through Culture." A report of this meeting appears in *The Indian P.E.N.* for October 1963. Professor Bannerjee defined lucidly the peculiar *universalizing* quality of that aspect of culture which consists in laying aside all predilections in appreciating impersonal truth.

Below is the full text of Dr. Gundappa's address.—ED.]

UNITY THROUGH CULTURE

TODAY is a day marked with red in the calendar of the Indian Institute of World Culture. It is a day of inspirational significance to all who were privileged to know its founder Shri Wadiaji. It is a day of special importance to all who have a care for the higher things of life.

For such an occasion, I sincerely wish the speaker chosen had been some one abler and worthier. Frankly, I find myself in this position all unexpectedly and all unprepared. When our esteemed friend Shri B. Vasudevamurthy invited me to join in paying homage to the memory

of Shri Wadia, I readily agreed, because paying homage to him is to me a great pleasure as well as a heart-bidden duty. But I had no idea I would be expected to deliver what is described as the Founder's Day Address. Saying a few words expressive of the heart's reverence and gratitude is one thing; a full-dress discourse on so grand a thesis as "Unity Through Culture" is quite a different thing. I pleaded my utter inability in all honesty. But the good Secretary Mr. Venkataramaiya said he was only carrying out the wishes of Madame Wadia. That settled it. Her wish is to me a command as it is a compliment. This preface implies that I look to my hearers for forgiveness for a disappointing performance.

Let us first devote a few moments to the memory of him whose good name lives in these premises so visibly and so unforgettably. Wadia was a blessed man — a *punyavan,* as we may say in Sanskrit. Coming of a family noted for philanthropy as for wealth, it was his good fortune to see early in life a purpose to which to dedicate all that was his. That purpose was to uplift life around — to make life worth while by discovering the meaning and purpose of life and shaping life's conduct and activities to serve that end. In one word, it was to promote the study and the pursuit of the good and the worthy in life. It was a mission of culture.

I first saw Wadiaji, I think, about 1913-14. He was then in charge of the daily paper *New India* edited by Mrs. Annie Besant in Madras. I had previously read of Wadia and his activities. He had begun to organize the labour population in Madras and give it a mind and a voice. He, together with Mrs. Annie Besant and Mr. Arundale, had been kept in internment at Coimbatore for three months or so by the Government of Lord Pentland. It was clear the Government had taken him seriously. I was then young — fifty years ago; and that is a stage of life when anything daring and dangerous fascinates. When I asked to be taken to Mr. Wadia, the clerk at the *New India* office asked me to sit waiting in the office room. Mr. Wadia was busy in the typesetting room, and would come back in half an hour. But I was impatient and rushed upstairs. The clerk understood and ran up and announced me. Mr. Wadia was instructing the compositors about some point of display type. He raised his head and greeted me with an eloquent smile saying, "Come along. You see my fingers aren't fit for a shakehand!" I said I was no stranger to the experience and added that a spoon of caustic-soda solution was all we needed, unlike Lady Macbeth to whom the seven seas could not

suffice. Mr. Wadia laughed a loud hearty laugh, and we sat there on a bench and talked like old-time friends. This heartiness of the man — this utter lack of suspicion and readiness to put trust in an unknown man — that formed a characteristic of his. We met several times soon afterwards. Those were days when India's public life was being put through a process of galvanization by Mrs. Besant and her colleagues. In the offices of the Home Rule League and the Sons of India Order and the Sons of India Bookshop, I had opportunities of meeting Mr. Wadia and seeing something of the infectious energy and flaming enthusiasm which he brought to the building up of the movement.

Mr. Wadia was a tremendous worker; and his distinction lay in the art of making you think that he took no trouble at all and that all came to him easy. There was no sighing and no resting. On the contrary, it was all one continuous flow of joyous excitement.

Some three or four years later we lost touch with each other. He was away in America and elsewhere. I was able to resume the contact about the time of founding this Institute. Madame Wadia and he were pleased to honour me by asking for my views and ideas. Subsequently I had many opportunities of watching him at work. He was a skilled organizer. He planned boldly and carried the plans through with singleness of mind and unflagging faith. He met my occasional words of discouragement with a message of hope based upon his inner confidence. For all his outward imperturbability, he was a tender-hearted man, sensitive and responsive. I can never forget the language of distressed indignation in which he described to me the scenes of riotous fury witnessed in Bombay, as the issue of linguistic fanaticism, before the separation of Gujarat from Maharashtra. His mind had the noble stature and the dignified bearing of his physical figure; and it is of high significance that he expanded the scope and ambit of this Institute by making it take all world culture into its fold.

I should like to make use of this occasion to acknowledge with sincere gratitude the generous help given by Mr. and Madame Wadia to the founding and building of the Gokhale Institute of Public Affairs. Many are the causes and the institutions they have supported with a generosity all their own. To recall the personality and character of B. P. Wadia to mind is to betake ourselves to an unfailing fountain of refreshment for the spirit. The thesis assigned to me for discourse today — Unity Through Culture — sums up to my mind the mission of Mr. B. P. Wadia's whole life of some seventy years.

The thesis takes two things for granted: first, that unity is something good and fit to be desired; and, second, that culture is the means for its attainment. It is important that we should make clear to our minds what we mean by the two words.

Unity ordinarily is the feeling of oneness in a body of people: a feeling born of a sense of common interests and mutual concern and fellowship in collective living.

Unity is of two kinds: the Philosophical and the Practical. The Philosophical is derived from metaphysics and ethics — from considerations of the nature of the world and the nature of the soul and from appreciation of the deeper strata of life and destiny and relationship in the world. Unity of this kind is spiritual in aim. Not that it rules out considerations of the practical world. It does call for the offices of prudence and discretion in the affairs of life. But calculation of convenience and advantage is secondary here; and, what is more, prudence is here a part of applied ethics. When prudence and discretion are not disloyal to spiritual truth, they become accepted as part of its armoury. Unity of this spiritual kind is both a duty and a discipline. It rids the soul of its egoistic encumbrances and helps it to come into its own fullness of being. It is to unity of this variety that I propose devoting attention.

The other kind of unity is purely secular. It is based chiefly upon considerations of gain and success in the world's transactions. Not that this is wrong in itself. But ethical considerations are extraneous here. They may come in as good policy. But the central motive is expediency. Success is the test. To speak of unity of this kind, now is not the occasion. Culture may be useful to it as an ornament, but it is not integral to it. In the context of culture, the unity relevant is of the spiritual or philosophical kind.

The unity we are thus concerned with is the unity of individual man with the universe which he usually regards as distinct from himself. This unity includes the family, the nation, the international community, and every other intermediate form of human relationship. In one word, the unity contemplated is man's complete self-identification with all that there is, and his seeing nothing other than his own self in any being anywhere and in any circumstances.

Why is this unity considered good? It is good because it abolishes the separateness of an individual's life and enlarges the field of life for him without limit. Abolition of separateness is the elimination of grounds of conflict. Conflict is restlessness, anxiety, fear, and unhappiness, and is the parent of sin. Separateness breeds the sense of want and

the fear of loss, and instigates desire which may lead to sin. Fear and grief can find room for their feet only when we see the possibility of someone else being in existence besides our dear selves, to compete against us for the goods of the world and to inflict pain or privation upon us in the struggle for the mastery of the earth. Abolish all that is not yourself from existence; you then stand without a rival or enemy, and you are thus uninterruptedly and endlessly happy.

Is solitariness then the ideal? Is not the existing severality of beings of any good use? Solitary existence is not life; for life means intelligent activity and experience; and it calls for both a knower of things and things to be known, both a feeler of feelings and objects to be felt. Existence without knowing and feeling — without ends to achieve and things to do — is no life. If this be the condition of unity — this abolition of interesting plurality and the reducing of life to a monotonous nullity — how should it be counted the highest of aspirations for man? Why should we aspire towards it?

The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* poses the dilemma:

Ekākī na ramate (The solitary one has no happiness).

Why then should there not be a companion? The answer is:

Dvitīyāt vai bhayam bhavati (Fear surely arises when there is a second person in existence).

Having stated the dilemma, the Upaniṣad proceeds to indicate that the contradiction between unity and severality is only apparent and that there is a way of synthesizing both propositions.

Sa yo:ta ekaikam upāste na sa veda. Akṛtsno hyeṣo:ta ekaikena bhavati. Atmetyevopāsīta. Atra hyete sarva ekam bhavaṅti.

(He who regards each of the several as a separate entity does not know the truth. Counting them one by one, each separately, he comprehends not the whole of reality. All should be regarded only as Atman. Then in the realization of Atman, the all becomes one.)

This is the truth of the matter. The substratum is Atman, or life-principle; the superstrata are the several life-forms of the world. If we accept this postulate, it follows that we must recognize every form of being as a different manifestation of the same essence. Let the variation and separateness of a fellow being be ever so great, he or she or it is in essence not unrelated to me, but on the contrary the same as that which functions in me as "I."

This attitude does not ask for the factual abolition of any variation of form or any separateness of life-processes. It only asks that you should identify yourself, in thought and feeling, with each entity of this multiple world. It is not world-abolition, but self-reorientation that is called for. It is the attitude of mind *within oneself* that should be revised and readjusted towards whatever seems to one strange and remote and not one's own. The *Gita* has a short expression *atmaupamya* — (self-assimilation) — for the idea.

Atmaupamyena sarvatra
Samam paśyati yo:rjuna
Sukham vā yadi vā duḥkhaṃ
Sa yogī paramo mataḥ

(He who looks upon every scene of happiness or of sorrow as though he were himself the person involved in it equally — who sees the image of himself in it without distinction — is in my view the highest of yogis.)

"The ugly one too I am, as much as the handsome one; the bad too I am as much as the good; the dull and the demented I am as much as I am the wise and the learned; the sinful I am as much as I am the virtuous and the noble." Such identification of oneself with all one finds in existence is self-assimilation or *atmaupamya*. It is the supreme point of unity and the supreme achievement of self-culture. It requires an effort of heart's imagination, rather than an exercise of mere intellect. The intellect can analyse and argue and ratiocinate. It could bring us a glimpse of the truth and convince us. But that conviction needs to be translated into the facts of life, so as to transmute life from a struggle to an effortless *leela* or play. The heart and the mind should express the truth of Atman in one's little acts of every minute and in one's relations of every kind. It is this constant practice of *atmaupamya* or self-assimilation that is the core of culture in our present context.

The real difficulty of this achievement is in the obstacles placed in the path by the conflict of the three *guṇas* or basic impulses in human nature. They are *Sattva* or the urge for enlightenment and wisdom; *Rajas* or passion which makes for restless activity; and *Tamas* or lethargy and darkness. These three impulses are found *unequally* mixed everywhere, so that they should always be in a state of flux. Their equilibrium would mean the cessation of the world-processes. The very word *jagat* — meaning that which keeps moving — hits off the characteristic of the world. And the three *guṇas* are the mainsprings of the world-mechanism. It is they that prompt man's reaction to the diversities and separatenesses in the world and make him miss the unity

beneath the severality.

Keeping a steadfast hold upon the principle of unity is our hope of emancipation from conflict. The purpose of culture is to promote *Sattva* by freeing it from the hustling goad of *Rajas* and the darkening contamination of *Tamas*. This is necessarily a long process, not admitting of impatience or haste. It is a process of careful self-examination and hard self-training. The schools of training are the family, the clan, the town, the State, the nation, and all the living world. *Dharma* is this process of self-discipline, and it is co-extensive with the entire field of life. The discipline of *Dharma* wears out the dross of *Tamas* and modifies the strain of *Rajas,* and so strengthens *Sattva.* All virtues and all graces of behaviour serve to purify man. *Dharma* purges the soul's eye of its blinding rheum and widens its horizons. Friendship, fellowship in work or play, sympathy, charity — all these extensions of the concern of the heart, out of the narrow limits set to it by ego, serve to build up the *Sattva* element in us and take us nearer to the ideal of unity or *atmaupamya.*

Sarvabhūteṣu sasneho
Yathā::tmani tathā:pare

(Love felt for every being as for one's own self)
is *atmaupamya.*

Here comes up another matter for attention. The words of Shri-Krishna are:

Atmaupamyena sarvatra
Samaṃ paśyati yo:rjuna.

What is the implication of *samaṃ* here? The Lord uses this phrase again and again. Is the *samatā* equality of inner concern or uniformity of outer expression? It would make nonsense if *samatā* meant uniformity of external treatment in the verse

Vidyāvinayasaṃpanne
Brāhmaṇe gavi hastini
Śuni caiva śvapāke ca
Paṇḍitāḥ samadarśinaḥ

Are the brahmin, the cow, the elephant, the dog, and the dog-eater — all to be given the same kind of food, the same kind of dwelling, and the same kind of clothing? If so, whose is the standard to be applied to the rest: a kennel to each for habitation or grass to each for nourishment? That would obviously be perverse.

Living is a world-activity carried on on the material plane, and the diversities of material condition are inescapable. Applying the logic of Jesus Christ, we must give to matter what is due to things material, and to the spirit what is due to things spiritual. This distinction, existing in fact, is not to be ignored in the interpretation of an ideal. The ideal of equality is in fact best approached through the rendering of what is due to the inequalities presented by nature. The purpose of equality or *samatā* is to help growth. It is to promote the development of the person in view. It is to add to the strength of the object concerned. Such help is best rendered when the external conditions are studied and their needs appreciated. The cow has no use for a sofa and the dog cannot eat grass.

A mother's love for her children is equal; it is marked by *samatā*. But that very love makes her observe the peculiar disposition of each child, study its particular capacity to digest and its special need of nourishment, and so serve to each child food of a different kind and in a different quantity. This difference in service does not take away the equality of her concern for all.

Let us look at the way of the good teacher. His solicitude for all the twenty boys in a class is equal. He keeps himself free from partiality or favouritism. But his method of teaching varies according to the aptitude of the student, the capacity of his intelligence to grasp the subject, and his physical stamina for hard tasks. The treatment must vary to a larger or to a smaller extent from student to student. It is this individual differentiation that makes for the efficacy of the lesson taught.

Let us take the case of a medical man. A dozen fever patients may be in his ward. Even if they all suffer from the same illness, dosage and dietary may vary from patient to patient on account of their differences in age, stamina, and style of normal living. It is differentiation in treatment that makes for effective cure for all.

We thus see that inequality in outward treatment is a condition required by the interior feeling for equality for its due fulfilment.

I have dwelt at such length on the topic of equality because equality is often insisted upon as a condition of unity in a body of people. The doctrine of equality may easily turn out a superstition. Mechanically enforced, it may lead to social disaster.

The diversities and separatenesses which stand in the way of unity are in two categories: one of kind and another of degree. Sweet and pungent are differences of kind; but sugar and jaggery are differences of degree. One's friend and one's enemy are differences of kind; one's

son and one's nephew are differences of degree. But of both categories, the determinant is one's ego. The *I*-sense decides the differences of *this* and *that* as well as the differences of *me* and *mine*. If, therefore, equality of love is to come into play, regulation of the ego principle is the first requisite. That is the purpose of all the rules and injunctions of the *śāstras*.

Students of Aristotle will remember that philosopher's view that unity in the organization of the State is something purposive and conditional and not absolute. Unity there — on the material plane — is a means to an end. Therefore, there are degrees of unity to be reckoned; and the degree of unity to be attained at any level is determined by the function called for at that level. Unity is neither a formality nor a superstition, nor yet a requirement of convention. It has a rationale to support it. And that rationale is in the function to be performed for the common good. This distinction of degrees in the organization of the State is necessary because, if superstitiously or mechanically enforced, unity may involve the suppression of individuality and the sacrifice of diversities in gift and service indispensably essential to good life in society. Those who think of reforming Hindu society may be invited to give earnest thought to this aspect of the matter.

Many of the diversities and divisions of mankind have their roots deep in the unfathomable fields of nature, and are therefore not abolishable. Nor are they all bad. Indeed some of them are good and helpful provided they are kept within limits. The best way to find out and enforce proper limits is to recognize the needs of the entities which we desire to see unified. Provision should be made for the just self-expression of each of the components and the harmonious co-existence of all of them within the borders of the larger unity. This is the principle of federalism seen in practice in the working of unions of States like the U.S.A. and in the combination of industrial and commercial corporations for certain purposes common to all of them. Each federating unit retains for itself a large part of its individual rights and powers, and at the same time puts certain other powers into the common pool for joint use. Unity even on the material plane is thus a matter of assiduous study and careful adjustment. Unity cannot prevail long by suppressing the vital rights of individuality. A unity which ignores the individuality of the component is sure to crack and burst up some day, like a steam-boiler not provided with escape valves for the excess of steam.

Atmaupamya or self-assimilation is one's putting oneself mentally in the position of the man one has to deal with, so that one could

experience how that man feels in his situation, and understand why he feels so. It is an act of moral and intellectual self-transference and self-translation into a situation not habitually one's own. This way of acquiring an insight into the workings of other people's minds is a great means of removing misunderstandings and building up unity — unity among States and nations as among individuals and their groups. Mutual understanding is an organic part of culture, and its prerequisite is humility of spirit. The mind of the man who is satisfied that his own knowledge and wisdom are sufficient for all purposes is proof against enlightenment. His mind is encrusted with an impenetrable layer of ego; and ego is the enemy of good understanding. A full-hearted recognition of one's own limitations is a necessary prelude to freshness of understanding. As the Bible puts it, the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.

There are two ways of dealing with man's ego, which is responsible for all the disunifying factors we observe, so that the vision of inner unity may stay firm and inform life's activity with that universal love which is the *atmaupamya* ideal. The poet Nilakantha Dikshita has put it in a crisp verse:

Tyaktavyo mamakāraḥ
Tyaktum yadi śakyate nāsau
Kartavyo mamakāraḥ
Kintu sa sarvatra kartavyaḥ

(One must give up attachment to *me* and *mine*. But if one is not able to do that, then one must practise *me* and *mine* through every being everywhere.)

The latter is the spirit of unity that one should cultivate if one would live in harmony with oneself and the world. That is the teaching of the Upaniṣads. The *Kaṭha,* for example:

Manasaivedamāptavyam
Neha nānā:sti kiṃcana

(By the mind is this to be realized — that there is here no plurality and no diversity even in the least degree.)

The *Brihadāraṇyaka* affirms the same: the realization should be in the region of the mind and the heart. The emphasis is on the inner attitude rather than on the outer form: *manasaiva.* It is culture: it is the thawing of the hard, icy parts of our nature.

Culture in our context is, therefore, the training of the soul, out of the unsocial and anti-social *vāsanās* with which it comes into this world,

and into social and humanitarian ways of living. Literature, the arts, social contacts and the graces of personal intercourse are all parts of that culture. There is in our time a glib manner of talking about communities and clans and groups of other kinds which have come down from of yore. It is usual to speak disparagingly of them as barriers which divide. But there is another side to the medal. Those barriers protect the weak and give them a sense of security. The home and the community are concrete realities to the average man. Humanity and the universe are abstractions too vague and too vast for him to identify and grasp. A great Maharaja built a new palace for himself which had vast halls and spacious verandahs. He was one day showing a friend round it — another great Maharaja — and they both went from room to room, which, to the visitor, was from hall to hall. When they had traversed the whole building, the visiting Maharaja asked the host, "Your Highness, where are your living rooms?" The host replied: "Why, over the whole place!" The visitor rejoined: "You *walk* over the whole place. I am speaking of *living*. Does one *live* in a big hall like this? Suppose you want to have an intimate joke with your wife. Should you not have some privacy?" Intimacy is living. The family and the community give one a sense of intimacy. From the point of view of the earth and the sky, intimacy is something narrow. But from the point of view of the little man it is a strength to the soul.

Let us therefore not speak with scorn about divisions and diversities. They have their place in life; but they become harmful only when they come to obscure the larger reality. Cultivating the sense of the larger unity is thus the need. Keeping the larger unity constantly in view is the purpose of culture. Culture does it by liberating the energies of *Sattva*; *Sattva* which lies hidden in every one of us, *Sattva* which is the sweetness and light of *Ātman*.

The broadest basis, the most enduring basis, indeed the truly limitless basis of unity is *Ātman*, Self or Soul. It is the life-principle which, as manifested in the individual, is *Jiva*; as viewed in its immanent and omnipotent aspect is *Īśvara* or *Paramātman*; and in its all-transcending and infinite aspect, is *Parabrahman*. *Ātman* is thus the most essential and the most abiding element of our being, and should as such be the supreme criterion of value for the appraisal of the world and its goods. Whatever helps man's progress towards the comprehension of the *Ātman* is ultimately the good. If the world's pleasures entice one towards things that will ultimately lead one to the upward path, pleasure is good. Whatever is likely to hinder or delay that progress and make one lose

sight of *Ātman* is bad, though pleasant for the moment, and to be avoided. Such study and pursuit of the values of life, as judged by the criterion of progress towards *Ātman*, is culture. Whatever opens the eye to new aspects of life, to new problems of living, to new beauties of idea and conduct, to new possibilities of improvement in human nature — all of it forms an essential part of culture. Nothing that is of interest to man is outside the purview of culture. Culture seeks to know about all, to understand all, to sift and test all, and finally to assimilate to itself whatever is of value in all.

True culture is cosmopolitan. It excludes no part or section of mankind from its precincts. In Mahatma Gandhi's language, it keeps the windows of its house open to winds blowing from every quarter of the globe so that it may keep constantly fresh and sensitive. Such, I think, was Shri Wadiaji's concept of world culture. May his memory live undimmed and may the ideals of his Institute prosper!

D. V. GUNDAPPA

TWILIGHT

Now is the time when thoughts are dreaming ships
Sailing in placid waters or at rest
In some hushed harbour lanterned by the moon.

Now is the time when flower-scents are borne
On breezes light as gossamer, and birds
Sing a sweet requiem for passing day.

Now is the magic interval before
Night like a benediction spreads her cloak
And sleep, with gentle hands, erases care.

HERBERT BLUEN

MORALITY AND RELIGION

[**Mr. Arthur L. Herman, M.A.,** has taught philosophy, logic, and the humanities, and is at present attached to the Department of Philosophy at Harvard. Readers will remember his examination of the concept of *Māyā* in our issue of June 1963.

In this long essay, of which the first part appears below, he examines the relations of morality and religion. The subject is of great importance; and yet professional philosophers have expressed conflicting opinions on it. The matter is to be elucidated by a right understanding of the two levels of morality and of religion. Morality has an inspiration and a mechanism; religion has the aspects of realization and ritual. We hold that where these aspects are in the right relation within morality and religion, morality and religion find their oneness in the spontaneity of spiritual living.—ED.]

I

FIVE RELATIONS BETWEEN MORALITY AND RELIGION

IN THIS PAPER I am going to concern myself with the relationships between two concepts: morality and religion.

By "morality" I will mean the discipline embodying the rules governing the relationships which obtain among men, or between men and the world around them, in respect to action: morality concerns itself with behaviour between a man and other men, or between a man and other physical objects. This behaviour is governed by a code of rules or laws which are explicit or implicit in the attitude with which a man acts or contemplates action within an environment of other men or physical objects. I want to make this definition wide enough to include such actions as not only the killing of animals, but also the destruction of non-living objects; for there are some groups of people (Hindus and Buddhists, for example) who would regard such actions as wrong or immoral in so far as they violate a moral rule or law which these people believe ought to govern their conduct in this world. Thus, M. K. Gandhi stated that a man has no right to destroy anything which he cannot, himself, create; such a rule governed his attitude towards other men and animals, and even towards such physical objects as paper and furniture. Consequently, morality is that discipline which deals with man's "this-worldly" relationship to objects in the world,

and it is the discipline which men feel governs their conduct and behaviour in relation to these objects. The objective or aim of morality might be said to be the production of a "good" man, a man whose actions are in accord with a code of normative rules, who behaves "rightly" when he follows these laws, "wrongly" when he acts contrary to them, and "neutrally" when his acts are neither right nor wrong, i.e., neither enjoined nor prohibited by the code (e.g., closing doors, drinking tea, etc.).

By "religion" I will mean, very simply, man's relationship to an "other-or-non–worldly" entity, a non-physical Being, which relationship is one of adoration, awe, love, or fear on man's part towards this Being. Such a Being may permeate the world-stuff somehow, as in pantheism, or be part of the world but not limited in any sense by the world, as in panentheism, or be wholly transcendent and separated from the world though connected to the world through, perhaps, the love and adoration of Its creatures, as in theism. Religion, then, is defined by the object of worship, which in turn defines particular religions by specifying man's attitude towards this immanent or transcendent Being. The objective or aim of religion might be said to be the production of a "God-like" man, a man at one with this Being, integrated with this Deity. Thus religion has a mystical, supra-physical goal.

These definitions of morality and religion are purposely intended to keep the two concepts wholly separate and mutually exclusive. I want to be able to say that in some unique sense religion is not morality, and morality is not religion; that, as defined, the two concepts involve quite different goals. However, when we investigate the different kinds of logical relations that exist between the two concepts we shall find that men have not always found morality and religion to be as separate as our definitions pretended they were.

In what follows, I want to look at our two concepts in terms of three types of logical relations — Identity, Inclusion, and Exclusion — in order to provide a background and a framework for a final discussion of two of these logical relations (two kinds of exclusion, to be specific). That final discussion will involve an examination of a number of modern thinkers, one from India (in Part II) and others principally from the West (in Part III) on the matter of the relations of exclusion between morality and religion. To begin with, however, I want briefly to look at the above three relations.

Several kinds of logical relations can be found to exist between the concepts of morality and religion. They are the Relations of Identity,

Inclusion, and Exclusion. The latter two relations in turn contain two separate relations each, thereby giving us a total of five quite distinct relations.

The Relation of Identity between morality and religion exists when the ends of morality and religion are seen as ultimately one and the same; that is, when being good and being God-like are regarded as not essentially different. The supporters of the identity position maintain that when one is religious, one is also moral, and *vice versa*. This position does not maintain that by being religious (by becoming God-like) one becomes moral (by being good). It merely says that the two concepts are necessarily indistinguishable, and that when you are religious, you are moral (there is no question of becoming the latter in virtue of being the former), and *vice versa*.

In terms of what we might call a religious and a moral language, the matter can be stated as follows: An injunction or imperative in one of the two disciplines is translatable into an imperative or injunction of the other discipline without essential change of meaning. Thus the doctrine of identity holds that "Be thou God-like" (a religious injunction) has the same meaning as "Be thou good" (a moral imperative), and also that all moral imperatives can be translated into equivalent religious injunctions, and *vice versa*.

A second kind of relation assumes that the two disciplines of morality and religion are related by inclusion in that one of the disciplines includes the other as a part of itself. Thus, where we have an instance of morality having "swallowed religion whole" (and not having chewed it up and digested it, a case of Religious Exclusion to be documented below), wherein morality is dominant over religion, we have what I shall call the Relation of Religious Inclusion, for religion is included in but secondary to morality. One can visualize a small circle (religion) included in a larger circle (morality) in order to grasp the image of inclusion; thus there is much that is moral without being religious; for anything lying outside the inner and smaller circle but inside the larger represents moral but not religious activity, and yet anything within that inner circle (religion) is necessarily also part of that outer circle (morality) which contains it. The circle diagrams will also be helpful in the visualization of the other relations. According to this Relation of Religious Inclusion, then, one may be moral without being religious, but one cannot be religious without also being moral. Further, one cannot become God-like except by being good first (a contention of Immanuel Kant's); only by following the Ten Commandments, or so

it has been argued, can one become God-like (or rather only by following the moral Commandments, for it may be argued that at least one, the First, of the Ten is a religious injunction, not a moral imperative); but one may be moral in thus following these imperatives but still remain un-God-like; thus the Relation of Religious Inclusion differs from the Relation of Identity mentioned above. Finally, in terms of moral and religious languages, the position of Religious Inclusion argues that all injunctions in the religious language are equivalent to some imperative in the moral discourse; but not all the moral imperatives are translatable into religious injunctions (refer again to the imagery of a small circle [religion] within a larger one [morality]), the reason again being simply that to be religious is to be moral but not the converse, i.e., one may follow a moral imperative and still not be said to be behaving religiously, while one cannot be said to be religious without admitting at the same time the presence of moral behaviour.

A third kind of position, the converse of the second, states that the two disciplines of morality and religion are related by inclusion; only now religion has "swallowed morality whole"; I call this position the Relation of Moral Inclusion. Here one may be religious without being moral, but one cannot be moral without also being religious. In addition, one cannot be good unless one has been God-like first; and, finally, all the moral imperatives of the language are translatable into their equivalents in the religious language, but not all the religious injunctions have moral-language equivalents. Thus the person who held this position might argue that the doctrine of *ahiṃsā* when stated in terms of imperatives ("thou shalt not injure any living thing") has some equivalent or other in the religious language, where reference would be made to not harming God, not injuring or disappointing the Deity, in some way or other ("thou shalt not grieve God" or, positively, "thou shalt love God"). At the same time, however, certain religious injunctions might have no comparable translation in the moral language, unlike those mentioned in the previous sentence.

A fourth and a fifth relation come under the Relation of Exclusion, which simply states that either morality or religion excludes the other discipline, religion, or morality. Thus the fourth position, the Relation of Religious Exclusion, states that morality is without religious significance. Morality is totally and completely independent of religion; one may be moral without being religious; and finally, proponents of this position would maintain that all religious language is really disguised moral language. Many scientists and philosophers of an empiricist incli-

nation who are unable to abide the "weak promises and philosophical vagaries" of most modern religions have attempted to show (when they do not already hold that all religious language is meaningless) that what religion has been talking about all along is nothing more than man's behaviour in the world, and that it has talked about it by employing disguised (because not immediately recognizable) moral imperatives. Hence, religious injunctions (which we might just arbitrarily define as injunctions concerning man's relation to a transcendent Being), such as "Be ye perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect" or "Love God with all thy heart and soul," are not to be interpreted as kinds of necessary injunctions to be God-like through moral endeavour and achievement as in the Relation of Identity, but rather they are really moral imperatives which mean nothing more nor less than "Be good," "Do right action," "Be moral," and so on. The Relation of Religious Exclusion, then, drops all references to a Deity by translating It out of the language, and replaces all allusions to God with the moral language of imperatives. This position will be examined at some length in Part III of this paper.

A fifth and final position, the Relation of Moral Exclusion, maintains that morality is of no concern to religion, that the business of man's being in this world at all is not to be good but just BE, to find out who one really is, to discover the God or Christ within oneself; man's duty is to know and be changed through this knowledge, and not to change the world. It argues that religion is wholly independent of morality; that one may therefore be religious without being moral; and finally, that all moral language, and all language whatsoever, is fraught with spiritual significance, and the real meaning of moral imperatives lies within the religious sphere generally and in religious injunctions especially. The proponents of this position argue that one's duty is not to this world, nor to the poor and the suffering in it, but rather towards the indwelling Self (*Ātman*) or transcendent God. Examples of advocates of this position might be found among many of the world's religious mystics, one of whom we shall have occasion to examine, along with the position he represents, in Part II of this paper. These mystics denigrate the moral discipline as a whole in order to exalt their own religious discipline. As an example of this attitude in the West, I would mention Dante's *Divine Comedy* and the figure of Virgil. When Dante, with his guide Virgil, looks upon the horrors of the Inferno and weeps for the souls he sees there in torture and torment, Virgil rouses him from his sentimental mood with a rebuke that might

indeed be the rallying cry of all the defenders of the position we have called the Relation of Moral Exclusion: "Who is more wicked than he who weeps over the judgement of God?" A harsh attitude, certainly, which few moderns would abide.

In summary of this rather hasty classification of relations between morality and religion, I might indicate what I have done. The five relations are: The Relation of Identity, wherein being good and being God-like are both ultimate concerns in man's mind, and to be one is necessarily to be the other; the Relation of Religious Inclusion and the Relation of Moral Inclusion wherein by practising one discipline one thereby achieves the other, though the two disciplines are not identical but related simply by one discipline being a means to, and prior to, the other, and including that other in itself (here again man's concern is to become both good and God-like); the Relation of Religious Exclusion and the Relation of Moral Exclusion, wherein one of the two disciplines is of no concern to the other, and, as I shall try to show with respect to the Relation of Moral Exclusion, the moral enterprise is even harmful to the religious or spiritual enterprise, or at least it has been so argued by a number of thinkers from both the East and the West, e.g., René Guénon, Frithjof Schuon, and J. Krishnamurti.

My discussion of the fourth and fifth relations and the thinkers mentioned above will continue in Parts II and III of this paper. The arguments presented there will attempt to show (and especially in Part III) in what respects morality can be said to destroy religion and in what sense religion can be seen to exclude morality. I think these arguments are interesting, and I think they have an intrinsic merit of their own which warrants attention and discussion. The interest in the position called Moral Exclusion lies principally in its unusualness; for it is curiously strange to argue that religion is or ought to be devoid of morality (as a discipline). The merit of the position lies in the apparently valid arguments generated from the position by the exponents of Moral Exclusion, arguments which have a certain cogency and make an odd sense once the presuppositions of the position are accepted. And most "religious" people, we shall see, do already accept these presuppositions.

ARTHUR L. HERMAN

(To be concluded)

IMPACT OF ENGLISH ON INDIAN LIFE

[Our old and esteemed friend, **Professor A. R. Wadia, M.P.,** has long been a distinguished figure in Indian education and philosophy. From the nineteen-twenties to this year, when friends and admirers celebrated his seventy-fifth birthday, he has participated constantly in the discussion of religious, philosophical, educational, and social problems. National recognition of his distinguished services in these fields is expressed in his having been nominated a Member of the Rajya Sabha. His views on this urgent question are moderate, well-informed, and sincerely felt. They deserve thoughtful attention.—Ed.]

The way in which the British quitted India will always be looked upon as one of the miracles of human history. They left with a wonderful grace and a justifiable pride that they were leaving behind them as legacies institutions they had built up during the two centuries of their rule. The administrative machinery they built up was on the whole a model of efficiency. We admired it when the British were here, and now it shines all the more brilliantly by sheer contrast. Even Gandhiji, who contributed most to the achievement of Indian freedom, expressed ungrudging admiration for their judicial system. As against our monarchic traditions we took to the democratic ideal of life and introduced it in our Constitution. The organization of our army, navy, and air force is a continuation of the old British organization, including the band with its Western martial songs.

But the greatest gift of the British has been the English language. As Raja Ram Mohan Roy had the vision to see more than a century ago, the English language has been the means of opening windows upon Western science and technology and Western classics in every department of literature. It did something more, which was foreseen by a few far-sighted Englishmen like Macaulay and Monroe and Elphinstone. It created a new sense of self-respect, kindled a new patriotism, even to the extent of creating revolutionaries with whom the freedom of India became a religion. The Indian universities, few though they were, sent out a body of educated Indians who were swayed by Western ideas and began to look upon themselves as the equals of their British rulers. The Indian National Congress brought together on the same platform the *élite* of the land from every nook and corner of India. This became possible only because there was the bond of English language in which the burning patriotism of the Bengali and the Bihari, the U.P. man and the South Indian, the Maharashtrian and the Gujarati, the Panjabi

and the Rajput, found eloquent expression. The classics of English literature became as much a part of an educated Indian's life as they could be of any Englishman's. Not content with learning and speaking English, many Indians have ventured to write in English, with conspicuous success. Some of them like Tagore, Sarojini Naidu, R. K. Narayan, Raja Rao, and Mulk Raj Anand are bound to be mentioned in any history of English literature. Oratory comes natural to Indians. The names of Srinivasa Sastri and Radhakrishnan figure high among English orators. I remember to have read an interesting story in this connection. An editor of a paper in England was in doubt about the pronunciation of a word and asked his assistant to look up a dictionary. The assistant said that Mr. Srinivasa Sastri pronounced it in a particular way; the editor was satisfied.

Gandhiji used to be very bitter about the predominance of English in India. But even he carried the message of Indian freedom to South India or to Bengal only in English, and his *Harijan* carried on the crusade against untouchability in English. Even so great a poet as Bharati in Tamilnad found it expedient to start an English weekly called *Bala Bharata.*

When Independence came and a Constitution for India had to be evolved it had to be done in English, though with a perverse inconsistency English did not find a place in Schedule VIII of the Constitution which enumerates fourteen Indian languages as the national languages of India. Surely English, which is the mother tongue of millions of Anglo-Indians and has been a language of even the most patriotic Indians all over India, had a right to be included in the list of national languages. But facts are more powerful than mere sentiment and even today, after fifteen years of independence, English knows no diminution in its wide use, and he would be a bold man who would venture to say when English will cease to be the dominant language among the *élite* in India.

With all that India owes to the English language it is difficult to understand that there are Indians, even among those educated in English, who are fanatically eager to oust English. It is a sign of our political immaturity that we are not able to face facts and we are waging a linguistic war which bodes no good to the future of India. It has to be admitted that English cannot aspire to be the common language of the Indian masses. The risk involved in having the English-educated as a superior caste cannot be gainsaid. All the same the solution of our linguistic problem is by no means so easy as some of our

patriots imagine. With fourteen languages recognized by the Constitution itself, the need of a common language is absolute. English fulfils that need. If it could be replaced by an Indian language by common consent the problem could be easily solved. Hindi is the only language which can possibly replace English and the Constitution has given it the status of the official language, if not of the national language. But Hindi has its own limitations. It cannot claim to be as well developed as Bengali or Tamil or Marathi. To non-Hindi-speaking Indians Hindi is only a little less foreign than English, and English with its rich vocabulary and its status as a world language can easily score over Hindi. Hindi is bound to offer certain advantages to the Hindi-speaking, and so the risk of the imperialism of the Hindi-speaking regions cannot be lightly dismissed.

Hindi claims to be spoken by the largest group of Indians, but they do not represent an absolute majority. It is made to include Urdu and various Hindi dialects. A standard Hindi has yet to develop. It has no counterpart to what has come to be known as the King's English or the Queen's English. All this may be rectified in time, but the worst enemy of Hindi is forthcoming in the claims of the various other Indian languages. The various States in India, recently organized on a linguistic basis, are bound to stand up for their own respective languages, and the Central Government, after having created the Frankensteinian monster of linguistic States, is constrained as a matter of political expediency to support the claims of regional languages. This makes the emergence of a common language for all India all the more difficult. In non-Hindi-speaking States, room has had to be made, under political pressure, for the study of Hindi as a compulsory subject in schools; but it is notorious that it receives step-motherly treatment and this makes the dream of having Hindi as the common language of India all the more difficult to realize. In the face of these difficulties the position of English in India, in spite of deteriorating standards, has gained in importance and the fanatical attacks on English by the champions of Hindi only make the solution of the linguistic tangle in India all the more difficult.

In spite of the inherent advantages that English enjoys at the present moment it is impossible to get over the anomaly of a language which, if not completely foreign, is still one spoken only by a very small minority of Anglo-Indians or at most by a minority, however significant, of English-educated Indians, becoming for all times the dominant language of India. On the other hand the cause of Hindi is not quite so

hopeless as its opponents try to make out. It is a Sanskritic language closely allied to Bengali, Marathi, and Gujarati. Even the four Dravidian languages of South India have in the course of centuries assimilated thousands of Sanskrit words, so that Hindi cannot be as foreign to Indians generally as English. Moreover, with his usual far-sightedness Mahatma Gandhi founded the Dakshina Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha and lakhs of South Indians have learned Hindi, and the opposition to Hindi comes mainly from politicians with a narrow outlook on the future of India. But for the time being at least the work of the Dakshina Bharat Hindi Prachar Sabha has not proceeded without creating difficulties. In spite of Gandhiji's advice it has not accepted along with the Dèvanagari the Urdu script which has been so familiar even to millions of Hindus in North India. Nor has the Sabha assimilated the words of Urdu origin which have entered into the fabric of North Indian Hindi. Hindi in the South, consciously or unconsciously, has favoured words of Sanskrit origin. Hence has arisen a paradox which can arise only in a country like India, the land of paradoxes *par excellence*. This trend finds favour with many eminent Hindus in North India. Their zeal to rid Hindi of all words of Urdu origin has naturally estranged millions of Muslims and has produced a highly Sanskritized Hindi which is often not intelligible even to those who claim Hindi as their mother tongue. It is interesting to note that the task of translating our Constitution into Hindi was entrusted to the purists of the new school, with the result that even so erudite a Hindi scholar as our late revered President, Rajendra Babu, as he has been lovingly known to his countrymen, failed to understand the Hindi version of our Constitution in parts. I had this verified during one of my talks with the late President. This new trend has also created a difficulty in the Hindi broadcasts from All India Radio. Till recently this Hindi was so highly Sanskritized that it was unintelligible to the millions of Hindus, and of course Muslims, more familiar with Urdu-Hindi or Hindustani. To complete the tragedy, this Sanskritized Hindi is more intelligible to South Indians and even to Maharashtrians than to North Indians. This points to the need of evolving Hindi in a way which is truly Indian. This will take time and must be a work of silent growth. No government can hope to create a language to suit the political exigencies of the day.

The cause of Hindi would have made more rapid progress to the advantage of India, if the Universities had been left to the Central Government. A unifying and coherent linguistic policy could then have been

evolved.

These difficulties have naturally given a fresh lease of life to English. This need not offend our national susceptibilities, because English has ceased to be the monopoly of England. It has become the language of the United States of America and of the self-governing dominions of the Commonwealth which till recently was the British Empire. Even other countries like Russia and Germany, the Baltic states, and the countries of South America have taken to English as the most important foreign language to be studied in their schools and universities. So it is no affront to the nationalism of India that English is destined to continue as an official language for several years to come. Apart from its unchallengeable claim as the most unifying force in India even at the political level, it will keep India abreast of the great scientific and technological advances abroad, which are made so rapidly that no translation can possibly hope to keep pace with them.

Even on the purely literary and linguistic side India will stand to gain by keeping the study of English alive. Politicians are apt to argue that English retards the growth of Indian languages. This is a typical example of how truth is at a discount in politics. The honest fact is that English has been responsible for a renaissance in every Indian language. New types of poetic compositions have been inspired by English poets. Novels and short stories, whether in translation or as original compositions, have become the order of the day. Hindu psychology does not lend itself to a correct appreciation of time. That is why the rich annals of Sanskrit literature can hardly boast of a historical classic. History has been usually lost in mythical legends. The study of Gibbon and Macaulay and other English historians has inspired many Indians in the last few generations and we can boast of great historians like Jadunath Sarkar, Sardesai, R. N. Mazumdar, and a host of others in every State of India. Even in the study of philosophy, which has had its home in India for centuries, the study of Western philosophy from Socrates and Plato and Aristotle downwards has proved to be a new source of inspiration in the critical appreciation of our own classics like the Upanishads and the *Gita* and has led to a wave of new and fresh thinking.

I have come across many eminent writers in some of the Indian languages and they have been honest enough to admit how much they owe to the masters of English literature, and they deplore the tendency to minimize and even to uproot this influence. Tagore in spite of his greatness was hardly known outside Bengal till the English version of his *Gitanjali* took the world by storm and brought him a Nobel

Laureateship and to India international recognition of her greatness in the world of literature. He has been an inspiration to innumerable writers in various Indian languages and this has become possible because Tagore's works in their English garb have gone beyond the boundaries of Bengal.

The same story repeats itself in the case of many other eminent Indian writers in Indian languages. Where would Bankim Chandra Chatterji have been without the inspiration of English novels? The great Iqbal was a product of Cambridge, which made him a great philosopher as well as a great poet in Urdu and Persian. English has now attained the paradoxical position that like a shadow it pursues us every time we try to get away from it. Dr. K. R. Srinivasa Iyengar has performed a useful service in his two books *Indo-Anglian Literature* and *Indian Writing in English*. Though by no means exhaustive, they bring out in a concentrated form how the joyous Indian renaissance has ventured to express itself in English, and very successfully.

As an example of a typical English-educated Indian I am tempted to cite my own case as to the amount of enlightenment I have garnered from thinkers like Green, Bradley, and Bosanquet, J. S. Mill and Herbert Spencer, and an endless series of other philosophers. English is rich in biographical literature, which has given me peeps not merely into the greatness of men but into the little weaknesses which bring out their humanity. But to drive away the blues to which I have been subject at times there is nothing like going through the pages of *Punch*, Douglas Jerrold's *Mrs. Caudel's Curtain Lectures* or Jerome K. Jerome's *Three Men in a Boat*. It was the joy of my school and college days to read the long novels of Scott and Dickens and Thackeray, and the English versions of Tolstoy and Victor Hugo. In recent years a busy life has taken away the time I could spare for such long classics. But Galsworthy with his wisdom, and P. G. Wodehouse with his Jeeves series, and Hardy, who is now a classic, have all afforded rich stores of reflection and gaiety. Who can exhaust the richness of English poetry? In Shakespeare one can find all the depths of human life with its comedies and tragedies. With Shelley we can fly to the skies and with Keats we can revel in beauty. With Tennyson we can gauge the depth of sorrow which follows death and with Browning one can philosophize. How I envy the man of leisure who can spend his days in a public library or better still in a library of his own! To a generation brought up in the midst of English books, to which I have the honour and good luck to belong, it sounds unbelievable that we shall soon have a generation of Indians who

will not read English as literature, but as a language, perhaps circumscribed within the limits of basic English with its limited vocabulary. Life will certainly be poorer without the wine of English literature. It may be that this phase of life in India was but a step in the evolution of a new India. English has shaken us up in every fibre of our life. It has made us aspirants to a democratic way of life, made us even socialists in spite of centuries of caste behind us. It has affected our religious and social customs. It has made us alive to the significance of time as epochs of history unveil themselves. It has made us patriots when but a century ago we were content to be ruled by foreigners, oblivious of the deeper interests of our country. It may be that in the years to come English will not have the vogue to which we have been accustomed for a century. But no one can unmake history, and future generations, even if ignorant of English, will have to be conscious of the abiding influence that English has been in the making of our history. After the bitterness of our political struggle with the British has become a memory of the past, in moments of philosophic calmness we may be tempted to echo the words of William Cowper:

> England, with all thy faults I love thee still.

A. R. WADIA

There is a song of England that wanders in the wind;
So sad it is and glad it is
That men who hear it madden and their eyes are wet and blind,
For the lowlands and the highlands
Of the unforgotten islands. . . .

ALFRED NOYES

SOME THOUGHTS ON "THE FALL OF HYPERION"

[**Miss Dorothy Hewlett**, novelist, playwright, and critic, has a wide knowledge of the Romantic Movement and is known especially as an authority on Keats. She and her husband Norman Kilgour are leading spirits in the Keats-Shelley Memorial Association and she herself is Honorary Editor and publisher of the Association's quarterly bulletin. Miss Hewlett has contributed often before to our pages. In August 1944 she wrote "Some Thoughts on the Philosophy of John Keats." Here she puts forward some thoughts on Keats's attempt to recast and complete the fragment "Hyperion."—ED.]

IN AN ATTEMPT to recast his unfinished "Hyperion" Keats took the first lines of the original poem:

> Deep in the shady sadness of a vale
> Far sunken from the healthy breath of morn,
> Far from the fiery noon, and eve's one star,

and placed them at 1.120. Why did he truncate and (to my thinking) misplace the magnificent opening of "Hyperion" and totally reject the lines following, lines which seem to us well-nigh perfect in conception and expression? Keats was a fine critic, a good self-critic: he surely must have recognized, with Shelley, Byron, and others of his generation, that here he approached a poetic peak, even allowing for a certain Miltonic echo. It was this echo which, according to his own statement, made him abandon the poem.

But could there have been a sounder artistic reason for abandoning his original work? The magnificent figure of Hyperion still, although touched by a terrible foreboding, supreme in the realm of the sun, attained heights of dramatic intensity scarcely rivalled within, or indeed outside, the canon of Keats's poetry. Into his "palace bright/Bastioned with pyramids of burning gold"

> He enter'd, but he enter'd full of wrath;
> His flaming robes stream'd out beyond his heels,
> And gave a roar, as if of earthly fire,
> That scared away the meek ethereal Hours
> And made their dove-wings tremble.

Here in his fiery realm Hyperion is still supreme, defiant, while the rest of the Titans mourn with Saturn, acknowledging defeat. Oceanus tells them that they fall "by course of Nature's law," for " 'tis the eternal

law/That first in beauty should be first in might." The Sea God puts reality before them in a great utterance:

> Now comes the pain of truth, to whom 'tis pain;
> O folly! for to bear all naked truths,
> And to envisage circumstance, all calm,
> That is the top of sovereignty.

Book II ends with the darkness of their grief suddenly and terribly illuminated by the light of a new day:

> It was Hyperion: — a granite peak
> His bright feet touch'd, and there he stay'd to view
> The misery his brilliance had betray'd
> To the most hateful seeing of itself.
> Golden his hair of short Numidian curl,
> Regal his shape majestic, a vast shade
> In midst of his own brightness. . . .

He sighs, standing in silence with hands pressed together. Four of the Titans, roused from their lethargy, give forth a great shout for Saturn, their fallen leader, in which Hyperion joins. But there is, there can be, no reply.

The unfinished Book III portrays young Apollo, destined, in place of the Titan Hyperion, to become God of the Sun and "Father of all Verse." Here, it seems to me, the poetry becomes comparatively nerveless. A new scene, Delos with its "olives green/And poplars and lawn-shading palms, and beech," is depicted in Keats's earlier manner of gentle sweetness all the more apparent as the reader's mind is filled with that "shady sadness of the vale" where Saturn sate mourning; with the tremendous background of rocks and torrents amid which the Titans grieve; and with the fine dynamic sky dominion of Hyperion. And, too, after the magnificent Hyperion Apollo himself seems a colourless figure as he wanders about the island weeping:

> . . . his bright tears
> Went trickling down the golden bow he held.

Mnemosyne, mother of the Muses and goddess of memory, comes to announce his great destiny. And here, I think, we might quote that fine critic, Leigh Hunt: "It strikes us that there is something too effeminate and human in the way in which Apollo received the exaltation which his wisdom is giving him. He weeps and wonders somewhat too fondly; but his power gathers nobly as he proceeds." Certainly Apollo

seems to speak more in the "large utterance of the early gods" when he cries:

> "Knowledge enormous makes a God of me.
> Names, deeds, gray legends, dire events, rebellions,
> Majesties, sovran voices, agonies,
> Creations and destroyings, all at once
> Pour into the wide hollows of my brain,
> And deify me, as if some blithe wine
> Or bright elixir peerless I had drunk,
> And so become immortal."

And yet we cannot feel the majesty of him as we did that of the fallen Hyperion. Perhaps it is because there is no essential drama in success, and perhaps Keats, as a poet eminently dramatic, felt this — and there he decided to abandon that fine fragment which is "Hyperion."

Yet why did he again take up the work? It was once the fashion to dismiss "The Fall of Hyperion" as an attempt to recast the poem when his powers were failing, an ineffective revision: more modern critics, however, including Middleton Murry, have recognized it as a major poem in its own right. Certainly there could be no question of failing powers in the autumn of 1819 when Keats wrote what has been considered his most perfect poem, the "Ode to Autumn." Murry thought that both poems, the Ode and "The Fall of Hyperion," were personal as symbolizing Keats 's growth as a poet, but it seems to me that the second is far more so in time, intensely personal. It would seem as if Keats was applying the ancient myth to himself; that it is the making of a poet, not of a god, which now occupied his mind.

Apollo in the earlier poem says of the coming of immortality that it was "as if some blithe wine/Or bright elixir I had drunk": the first incident in "The Fall of Hyperion" is the actual drinking from "a cool vessel of transparent juice"; the importance of which Keats underlines by adding: "That full draught is parent of my theme." Emerging from a "cloudy swoon" induced by the liquor he finds himself in the vast and ancient temple of Saturn, and the adventure begins.

The "Fall of Hyperion" is written in a taut blank verse not now Miltonic, using plainer language with a new artistry. As in theme, so in style it shows traces of another influence (see Canto 1.196), that of Dante's *Commedia* which Keats had been reading, not now in translation, but in the great original. But on the whole the poem is in Keats 's own voice.

The exact purport of "The Fall of Hyperion" is difficult to grasp — necessarily so, since it is only a fragment — but one thing is clear: there is a deep change of feeling. The author of "Hyperion" is proudly aware that he is a poet, but in this second work Keats is uncertain, humble. Is he poet or mere dreamer? This poem was designed to give the answer:

> Whether the dream now purposed to rehearse
> Be Poet's or Fanatic's will be known
> When this warm scribe my hand is in the grave.

Slowly he approaches the altar; an altar attended by a veiled figure standing, at the head of many marble steps, before an enormous effigy of Saturn. From the altar a sacrificial fire sends "forth maian incense" spreading "around/Forgetfulness of everything but bliss." The veiled ministrant, Moneta, the more austere Roman goddess of memory, who as Mnemosyne aided and counselled Apollo, is here the poet's mentor. She warns him that an inability to "mount up these immortal steps" will mean total annihilation. With great difficulty and in bodily anguish he approaches, suffocated by a numbing cold, but

> One minute before death, my iced foot touch'd
> The lowest stair; and as it touch'd, life seem'd
> To pour in at the toes: I mounted up,
> As once fair Angels on a ladder flew
> From the green turf to heaven.

Why, he asks Moneta, has he been permitted to survive the ordeal?

> "None can usurp this height," returned that shade,
> "But those to whom the miseries of the world
> Are misery, and will not let them rest."

Feeling his own unworth, the poet wonders why he is chosen rather than those who, knowing that misery, "labour for mortal good. These, Moneta answers, "are no vision'ries./... they are no dreamers weak;/ They seek no wonder but the human face;/ No music but a happy-noted voice.'" He is there, in the ancient fane, as "a dreaming thing":

> "Only the dreamer venoms all his days,
> Bearing more woe than all his sins deserve.
> Therefore, that happiness be somewhat shar'd,
> Such things as thou art are admitted oft
> Into like gardens thou didst pass erewhile,
> And suffer'd in these Temples; for that cause
> Thou standest safe beneath this statue's knees."

Then, amid the sweet savour of an altar freshly piled, the poet is vouchsafed a vision of Moneta unveiled:

> Then I saw a wan face,
> Not pin'd by human sorrows, but bright blanch'd
> By an immortal sickness which kills not;
> It works a constant change, which happy death
> Can put no end to; deathwards progressing
> To no death was that visage; it had pass'd
> The lily and the snow. . . .

The vision of this profoundly stricken face was almost too unbearable:

> But for her eyes I should have fled away.
> They held me back, with a benignant light,
> Soft-mitigated by divinest lids
> Half-closed, and visionless entire they seem'd
> Of all external things — they saw me not,
> But in blank splendour beam'd like the mild moon,
> Who comforts those she sees not. . . .

This vision of Moneta's face seems to me to be the apex of the poem as it stands, and all that follows, largely a recast of the first "Hyperion," redundant.

Gone is the old pride of poetic power: Keats has attained to a new humility purged from all pride by the ascent up a flight of steps, just as Dante was in Canto XII of the *Purgatorio*. All humanity, believer and unbeliever, must come at length to the Sermon on the Mount: "Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth." Shakespeare, Socrates, Christ; they all had to experience this healing despair. It is a part of the allegory of life, a process in the making of a soul. Keats had penetrated the veil, seeing in that bright-blanch'd face of Moneta a sublime vision of eternity.

DOROTHY HEWLETT

NO ONE ELSE in English poetry, save Shakespeare, has in expression quite the fascinating felicity of Keats, his perfection of loveliness. "I think," he said humbly, "I shall be among the English poets after my death." He is; he is with Shakespeare.

—MATTHEW ARNOLD

NEW BOOKS AND OLD

"MASTERPIECES OF WORLD PHILOSOPHY"*

In Britain there has been and is academic snobbery. One element in this has been to condemn books of "popularization," especially in philosophy. America, having to teach very large numbers, has produced books of popularization — welcomed in secret by our own students, pitchforked, as they are liable to be, into the study of philosophy, for example, before they have been taught how to find out whether Plato came before Aristotle.

One hundred and thirty-nine writers on Philosophy from Anaximander to Wittgenstein, including Indian and Chinese philosophers, are represented in these two hundred writings. The arrangement is chronological. A score of scholars at American universities accepted the task of writing the articles. In each case the title is the name of a written work; author and dates follow; then a statement of "principal ideas" in the writing; and then an essay of *c.* 3,000 words, seeking to give an objective account of the writing concerned and to appraise it. At the beginning of the volume is a glossary of philosophical terms.

The present reviewer has nothing but praise for the book. It may be pointed out that for extra-mural study it is invaluable.

It is, as will be seen, a large book. The best the reviewer can do is to quote specimens.

Anaximander. Among "principal ideas advanced": "The earth is shaped like a drum, and is surrounded by fire-filled hoops of mist with holes on their inner sides (the sun, moon and stars)."

Quoted from Anaximander: "The sea is left of the original moisture. The fire has dried up most of it and turned the rest salt by scorching it." (p. 2.)

Text:

> Anaximander worked out a theory of animal evolution based on the ideas of adaptation to environment and survival of the fittest . . . "while other animals quickly find food for themselves, man alone requires a lengthy period of suckling. Hence, had he been originally as he is now, he would never have survived." . . . human beings . . . were "like other animals, namely fish." (pp. 3-4.)

Confucius. Text:

> *Jen* is the foundation of Confucian ethics because *jen* stands for the ideal relationship among human beings. (p. 6.)
>
> With unmistakable clarity he asserts that good men sacrifice their lives in order to maintain *jen* and that never would they alter *jen* in order to survive any crisis. (p. 7.)
>
> [The ideal man] may not possess much technical knowledge about details but his mind is capable of grasping what is essential and significant. (p. 8.)

Quoted from Confucius: "If Heaven is not going to let this culture decline, what can the people of K'uang do to me?" (p. 9.)

Montaigne. Text:

> We have five senses, but it may require ten to see nature correctly. Our sense information may be as far removed from the truth as a blind man's view of colours . . . even if we possess all the needed senses, there is the possibility that they may be deceptive. The occurrence of illusions gives us some grounds

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* *Masterpieces of World Philosophy in Summary Form.* Edited by Frank N. Magill. Associate Editor Ian P. McGreal. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. xxx + 1,166 pp. 1963. 63*s.*)

for distrusting our senses . . . we realize that we can know only how things appear to us, and not how they are in themselves. (p. 364.)

LEIBNITZ. The universe has one basic reality, the perfect life, but consists of an infinity of centres of consciousness at different stages of evolution in experiencing the rest of the universe. Each "monad" is potentially the whole.

LA METTRIE insisted on the mechanism common to man and all other living things but insisted that all of these feel, and they share a common nature. He insisted on the psychosomatic view. He saw the importance in brain of size and convolution as index of progress, which takes place by transcending mechanism-instinct by increasing conscious manipulation. This includes speech: language is not an inherent possession of the human species as such but must have been invented by genius. Language is symbols. Hence the development of the moral experience, which is present in animals. ". . . in the whole universe there is but a single substance differently modified. . . ." (p. 486.)

VON HARTMANN. Among "principal ideas advanced:" "The universe is composed of atoms, but the atoms are atoms of force, not matter." (p. 660.)

Text:

. . . he argues that psychic activity is present in the lowest organisms and that sensibility is present in plants as well as in animals. (p. 663.)

TILLICH. There are three types of anxiety: (1) of fate and death, (2) of guilt, (3) emptiness and meaninglessness of life. These appeared predominantly in the course of Western civilization, the first at the end of ancient civilization, the second at the end of the Middle Ages, and the third at the end of the modern period. The decline of the city state and the rise of the great states, beyond the power of the individual to affect, produced the first type of anxiety, which had predominated Greek tragedy. The Middle Ages concentrated on the wrath of God, purgatory and hell, and hence asceticism, pilgrimages, masses, penance, and so on. In the modern period, mechanism reduces the individual to insignificance.

R. F. RATTRAY

The Soma-Hymns of the Ṛgveda: A Fresh Interpretation. Part III (*Ṛ.V.*, 9.51-70). By S. S. BHAWE. (Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda Research Series, 6. Oriental Institute, Baroda. 228 pp. 1962. Rs. 7.20)

Though part and parcel of the vast Sanskrit literature, the Vedas have always occupied a separate pedestal of their own. Not only are they traditionally believed to be of superhuman origin; their meaning is also supposed to be beyond the ken of ordinary mortals. The truth is that they are couched in what represents an early Aryan speech out of which was evolved the Sanskrit language as we know it. Thanks to the sanctity enjoyed by the Vedas, their texts have been handed down to us in their purity, including the original accent. Naturally their subject-matter is of vital importance so far as the early history of Indo-Aryan culture is concerned. Their study has been as exciting as it is beset with difficulties.

Vedic researches have of late been making tremendous strides both in India and abroad, and, as a result, have largely improved upon the previous attempts at interpreting the abstruse Vedic texts. Taking advantage of that, Professor S. S. Bhawe has undertaken a fresh interpretation of the whole of the *Ṛgveda*. The reason why he has chosen to start, not from the beginning but with the penultimate book thereof (*Maṇḍala* IX), as stated by him, is that it presents a homogeneous group, "a suitable unit for interpretation, especially

from the linguistic and philological point of view." The ninth *Maṇḍala*, it may be observed, contains *sūktas* or hymns all dedicated to Soma alone. The present is the third instalment, comprising *sūktas* 51-70, the first two parts having covered, respectively, *sūktas* 1-15 and 16-50.

The merit of Professor Bhawe's translation lies in the fact that it takes into account the best results obtained by scholars both Oriental and Occidental in the field of linguistics and philology, adheres closely to the Vedic rules of Pāṇini, and, at the same time, pays due consideration to the available early traditional commentaries like that of Sāyaṇa. Yet, in his humility, he considers his attempt only as a step forward, by no means the last word, as something that may in due course be supplanted by a better work. This only emphasizes the inherent difficulty of the subject with which scholars everywhere are grappling.

Special mention must be made of Pandit M. V. Upadhyaya, at present a mere schoolteacher at Baroda, whose excellent *Ṛkpadālocana* commentary (still in the making) in lucid Sanskrit is quoted as a sample and model, giving morphological and accentual *sādhana* of each individual word in the given hymns.

B. Ch. Chhabra

The Varieties of Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. Being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion Delivered at Edinburgh in 1901-1902 by William James. Enlarged Edition with Appendices and Introduction by Joseph Ratner. (University Books, New York. xliii + 626 pp. 1963. $10.00)

William James's famous Gifford Lectures still keep a hold on public interest, combining, as they do, two seemingly opposed trends — the analysing reason of the pragmatic psychological observer and the irrational (or supra-rational) consciousness of the religious or mystical devotee. Readers of The Aryan Path will remember Hugh I'A. Fausset's fine study of the book in the feature "New Books and Old" (March 1958). This new American edition is ample in character and production (physically it weighs 2½ lbs.), and has been enlarged by ten Appendices, extracts from James's other writings, letters, etc., which have some bearing on the main theme of the book. Professor Joseph Ratner has provided a critical Introduction, making comparisons with such writers as Freud, Dewey, and Fromm.

E. Weissman

The Fundamentals of Vedānta Philosophy: A Realistic Approach. By Swami Pratyagatmananda Saraswati. (Ganesh and Company, Madras. xv+ 320 pp. 1961. Rs. 15.00)

Representing the course of twelve lectures under the Sree Gopal Basu Mallick Endowment in the University of Calcutta, the present book by Swami Pratyagatmananda, as indicated by the change of title from *Introduction to Vedānta Philosophy* in the first edition to *Fundamentals of Vedānta Philosophy* in the second, "aims at dealing with the foundations rather than with the superstructure of Vedānta philosophy." "Its plan and line of action have been radical realism rather than 'idealism' in the ordinary orthodox term." The approach is fundamental Realism, and the author recommends reference to his previous and subsequent works in order to prepare the basic background. The scope of the book is defined by the theme set to the author by the University, which was "to indi-

cate the place of Vedānta in the economy of modern Western thought and estimate its value."

Now known by his monastic name, Swami Pratyagatmananda Saraswati, the author, Professor Pramathanatha Mukhopadhyaya, an eminent thinker, is known to have always been a tower of strength to Sir John Woodroffe and his cause, and several publications have appeared as their joint productions. In twelve chapters, followed by a Summary and Index, the author deals with such topics as Fact, Experience, *Brahman, Māyā,* Intuition, Matter, Form, Consciousness, *Cit,* Reality, etc.

The author seeks to prove that the Vedānta is the science of the realization of the highest. The fundamental teachings of the Vedānta, according to the author, lay down the foundations of ethics, aesthetics, and religion deeply and unshakably. The present thought-currents in the domains of science and religion, in the author's opinion, are tending to a position essentially similar to the *Brahmavāda* of the Upaniṣads. "Fundamental unity and continuity coupled with fundamental undefinability are . . . the plainest indications of current physical speculations," which find support also in biological science.

In the present context of the Chinese aggression and the national emergency, the following observations of the author bear unique significance:

> A nation's practical ethics and philosophy should be such that it lives and can hold its own on their basis against any combination of hostile or disintegrating environmental forces. . . . a Nation living to and up to this gospel (*i.e.*, of blessedness, fearlessness and deathlessness), truly in spirit and in action, can never come to grief, or find that it has lived in vain.

The printing and get-up maintain the high standard usually associated with Ganesh and Company's publications. We strongly commend the book to all libraries.

A. D. PUSALKER

An Introduction to Śaṅkara's Theory of Knowledge. By N. K. DEVARAJA. (Motilal Banarsi Dass, Banaras. 225 pp. 1962. Rs. 12.00)

The keynote of this book, styled by its author an "essay in exposition and interpretation" of the Vedānta of Śaṅkara, is that this teacher has been much maligned by his interpreters, ancient and modern, who have either "misunderstood or misinterpreted" him. Hence his rather ambitious attempt now to give a "rigorously objective" account of Śaṅkara's theory of knowledge based mainly on his own writings. This, however, has not been fully possible because the author has been "forced occasionally to consult the commentators" (p. i).

There are eight chapters in all in this book, inclusive of the Introduction. Perturbed at the dialectical invective "hidden Buddhist" (*Pracchanna Bauddha*), hurled against Śaṅkara by other scholiasts, the author is at pains here to prove that metaphysical resemblance between Advaita Vedānta and the *Vijñānavāda* and *Śūnyavāda* schools of Buddhism does not mean identity (pp. iv, 11ff., 108ff., 204ff.). Such invectives were part of the game in ancient Indian dialectics. Even the Advaitin is known to call the Vaiśeṣika a semi-nihilist (*ardha-Vainā́śika*). So also the comparison of Śaṅkara with Parmenides, Plotinus, Eckhart, Spinoza, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Berkeley, Bradley, and Bergson, of which our author disapproves (pp. 30ff.), should be viewed as no more than attempts at familiarizing students of Western thought with the Idealism of Śaṅkara.

The last chapter is "Final Criticism." The main subject is discussed in the earlier six chapters. In the second of these (pp. 88ff.), the author rightly

points out that the famous Advaitic word *Māyā* occurs in the Upaniṣads in "words rather than in ideas," and that *Adhyāsa* is an utter stranger to these texts. The book provides ample food for thought for the serious student of Advaita Vedānta.

H. G. NARAHARI

Buddhism and the Mythology of Evil: A Study in Theravāda Buddhism. By T. O. LING. (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. 179 pp. 1962. 24*s*.)

The "blurb" says that the author's aim in this book is to give a connected account of the demonology of the Buddhist Pali canon and to show its significance. What doctrinal or other enlightenment is sought by means of this somewhat unusual research, it is a little difficult to imagine; but the author has been at great pains to give a detailed survey of the references to Mara, the Evil One, contained in the Pali canon. This occupies nearly half the book; and the rest of the volume is devoted to a survey of the popular demonology of India and South-east Asia and of the attitude to the problem of evil in the *Abhidharma*.

The meaning of the Buddhist symbol of Mara, the Evil One, is explained in detail and is contrasted with some of the popular demons who are regarded as the cause of the many ills of life in South-east Asian countries and in India. The *pisacas, yaksas, rakshas,* and *bhutas* of the *Atharva Veda,* the *Nats* of the Burmans, and the *Phis* of the Thais are described and the manner in which these demonic beings are propitiated by spells, chants, and sacrifices is explained. The important point of difference between the animist's method of dealing with the ills of life and the Buddhist attitude is indicated by the author as follows:

> It is evident that this radical attitude which is found at the heart of Buddhism is in marked contrast with all everyday ways of viewing life. From the point of view of the Abhidhamma analysis, the beings with which the animist peoples the world (whether they are evil spirits or men) must be matters of delusion. But there is a more significant divergence between Buddhism and animism and it is with regard to the method. The animist's method of dealing with the ills of his existence is to look *outward* upon his world — and to project personal patterns upon the world and to identify certain hostile forces or powers in the world and to discover how best to deal with them by propitiation, spells, chants, sacrifices and so on.

The Buddhist way of overcoming *Mara,* on the contrary, is by spiritual means: by Right Effort, Right Mindfulness, and Right Concentration. As the *Dhammapada* says:

> Those who enter the path, and practise meditation,
> Are released from the bondage of Mara.

B. V. NARAYANA REDDY

A Modern Approach to Islam. By A. A. FYZEE. (Asia Publishing House, Bombay. 127 pp. 1963. Rs. 16.00)

This is a collection of four essays by the noted Indian Muslim scholar, Asaf A. A. Fyzee. They are animated, as the author says, by one central theme, the idea of the reinterpretation of Islam in the modern context.

It is clear that the problems of contemporary Islam are not peculiar to Islam as such. They are indeed the problems of all living religions. Even apart from historical religions, the religious consciousness itself is passing through critical moments. It is challenged in the name of reason to justify its existence, and to show the frame of reference in which it can find its significance.

If Islam, then, is to live and move it should discover the principle of its

movement within itself. What it needs above all is the reconstruction of its theology on the basis of a reawakened religious experience and once this is achieved the transformation in the relationship of law and religion is bound to follow, and mutual isolation between them to cease. Hence we feel that Shri Fyzee's concern for law is marked by overemphasis and his reinterpretation is much more in the nature of a programme for the future and the expression of a personal credo than an attempt at actual re-evaluation. But that his ideas should have provoked controversy is all to his credit. The truth of the prophetic tradition that differences in the community are a blessing still holds good. Shri Fyzee after all pleads the cause of non-conformity and not of disbelief, and the best that can be said of the non-conformist is that he also cannot force conformity to his ideas on others, and cannot withhold from them their right to dissent.

Shri Fyzee's reflections are marked by genuine sincerity and sympathetic criticism, and what he has written he has written with feeling and humility, virtues which Islam should cultivate in every way. The essays are marked by scholarly discrimination and extensive study, and help us to realize that religious life, as any other form of life, cannot maintain itself and advance by repetition but by assimilation, adjustment, and creation — certainly not through a creation out of nothing, but by a creative fusion of the past and the present.

SYED VAHIDUDDIN

Great Ideas and Theories of Modern Cosmology. By JAGJIT SINGH. (Constable, London. xii + 276 pp. Illustrated. 1961. 21*s*.)

Theories of cosmology can hardly be more than dubious speculations, supported here and there by fragments of tenuous, inconclusive evidence. But love of speculation is a common weakness; and attempts to satisfy the layman's curiosity about cosmological thought are, no doubt, worth while.

Whether Mr. Singh's book represents a *successful* attempt is questionable. It does display a field of strange — perhaps sensational — ideas, which many may find fresh and stimulating. It gives interesting information about discoveries of sound astronomical research. It is well produced and illustrated. But, when it turns to difficult ideas, it seems the kind of book which may easily leave general readers with a false sense of understanding more than they really do. Many of the "explanations" — superficially impressive — appear unenlightening, or even meaningless, upon analysis.

The style is irritating. Names, with little meaning for the layman, are strewn lavishly about; and the literary references, indiscriminately dragged in, are obscure, irrelevant, or trite.

The wrapper claims that Mr. Singh, with "vivid description and clever analogies" can "make the most difficult abstraction crystal-clear." Yet here are two typical extracts:

> It would therefore look as if this ball of fire were breathing "in fast thick pants" a mighty fountain of fire into a lifeless void. However, the panting phase is only a temporary affair and lasts a mere twinkle. For very soon the internal seething turmoil turns into a balanced tug of war wherein both parties pull the rope with equal might. When this happens the aggregate attains equilibrium and remains in that condition for aeons. This is how our own sun continues to shine and remain in a steady state. . . .
>
> That these pictures are painted at all — of material lumps falling out of abstract mathematical inventions like gravitational energy or supernovae bursting into our ken by the coalescence of isolated three-dimensional

slices of space-time with our own universe — is the result of our cosmological Odysseuses listening too intently to the siren song of metrical symbols without tying themselves firmly to the bark of empirical observation.

LEWIS HULL

The Traditional Theory of Literature. By RAY LIVINGSTON. (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis; Agents: Oxford University Press. 188 pp. 1962. $4.50)

The traditional theory of literature can be summarized in three words: *yogaḥ karmasu kauśalam* (yoga is skill in works). Every traditional artist chooses to follow his natural vocation diligently, trying to acquire a skilful hand by practising unceasingly with the tools tradition has handed over to him. In this life of dedicated work, as he strives towards the perfection of the Divine Architect in the execution of his art, a moment of intuition strikes a spark. The artist is then bathed in the continuous delight of an exalted creation and leaves behind a statue at Sravanabelgola, a cathedral at Canterbury, a *Divina Commedia*, a *Savitri*. It is the perfect union of tradition and individual talent. The result lives for all time.

This being the kernel, Mr. Livingston crystallizes the views of one of the foremost traditional thinkers of our time, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy. The traditional views on the relationship between man, society, and art; the creative process; the finished work of art and its functions; and judgement and criticism are set forth clearly in five chapters. Apart from the value of Mr. Livingston's book as a tabulated essay on the traditional theory of art, the book is especially welcome because it leads the reader to a further study of the writings of Coomaraswamy himself.

Coomaraswamy's unique distinction was that he admirably combined the best of the thinking of the East and the West. In his voluminous writings he repeatedly referred to the ideal works of literature that bring out the best of man to the betterment of mankind, for they are "supports of contemplation." Mr. Livingston summarizes Coomaraswamy's idea of the supreme work of art, which should have five characteristics: it

> should express archetypal myths and metaphysical principles that reflect and suggest cogently the true order of reality . . . it should be set forth in the form of poetry in which the very pulse of the universe resounds . . . it should be ornamented or furnished with those literary devices that enhance its efficacy . . . it should be beautiful . . . have a style.

Which very succinctly explains Coomaraswamy's abiding love for the *Divina Commedia* and Dante's own fame voyaging in eternity.

PREMA NANDAKUMAR

History of Oriya Literature. By MAYADHAR MANSINHA. (Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi. 275 pp. 1962. Cloth, Rs. 8.00; Paper, Rs. 6.00)

This volume is the third in the series of historical studies of literatures of our various languages in India — a happy and welcome publishing venture undertaken by the Sahitya Akademi. It would be quite appropriate to refer here to the fact that such a project was taken up with great enthusiasm by the P.E.N. in India in the forties of this century.

Dr. Mansinha, the chief compiler of the Oriya Encyclopaedia, is no doubt ideally suited to undertake the not-so-easy task of introducing his literature to the common reader. In 275 pages he compresses neatly the exciting his-

tory of almost a thousand years of Oriya literature. It is the unique glory of Oriya literature that the inscrutably mysterious Adivasi plays a significant role both as theme and as literary creator. This naturally heightens the unmistakably democratic character of Oriya literature and the synthetic pattern of Oriya culture.

Dr. Mansinha has treated his subject with scholarly detachment and critical acumen, and it is precisely because of these qualities which distinguish his writing that one may feel a jolt in finding here and there a tendency to catalogue names. Another drawback is that he appears to have scant enthusiasm for travelogues, autobiographies, *belles-lettres,* diaries, scientific treatises, and the like. Furthermore he completely forgets to trace the impact of nationalism and of the Second World War upon Oriya literature. Neither does he choose to mention the literary prizes awarded in Orissa (like the one instituted by the Maharaja of Kalahandi State, to be awarded annually for the best drama).

I have a feeling that the value of the book would have been enhanced had there been a literary map of Orissa. The Corrigenda is an eyesore and is incomplete. A book published under the imprint of the Sahitya Akademi certainly deserves more careful editorial attention.

DILIP KUMAR SEN

A Street Lamp and the Stars. The Autobiography of DON BORRELLI of Naples written with the help of ANTHONY THORNE. (Peter Davies, London. 206 pp. Illustrated. 1963. 21*s.*)

I do not think that even a confirmed sceptic could help being moved by this autobiography. Father Borrelli tells with disarming honesty, wit, sensitivity, and compassion a story that inevitably puts one in mind of St. Francis of Assisi reborn in twentieth-century Naples. Don Borrelli himself would fight shy of such a comparison, preferring to be just a young Neapolitan priest who decided to do something practical about the urchins in his beloved home city.

He became a *scugnizzo,* a ragged vagabond, in order to meet the urchins as one of themselves. He joined the small groups of children and youths — hundreds of them — who roamed the slums and fought one another each night for a "bed" on the grating of a baker's shop where a little warmth could be felt during the sharp Italian winter.

Like St. Francis, he had difficulty in persuading ecclesiastical authority to allow him to perform this Christian act of love and charity. Older colleagues were not slow to point out the dangers and indignity of such work for a priest. And indeed on his first night in the Italian slums Father Borrelli was afraid, for many of the urchins had razors and were quick to use them. But soon he realized that as a genuinely poor youth himself, with nothing to gain or lose, he was in no danger. He even joined in when these ravenously hungry children stole bread from the baker's shop. Contrition afterwards? Not a bit of it. "Give us this day, O Lord, our daily bread," is his only comment, and it will come as a shock to the comfortable moralist who can afford to take a high-toned view of Christian principles.

After a great struggle, Father Borrelli persuaded his Church to allow him to found the Casa dello Scugnizzo, House of Urchins. Here he gave the young people clean clothes and adequate food, and the chance to lead a good and useful life. He took them from the environment where even the police stole cigarette stubs from starving eight-year-old boys and themselves sold the filthy tobacco on the black market. He saved them from the degradation that he claims made nonsense of civilization itself.

This is a book to buy, read, and pass

on to your friends. The Father Borrellis are the salt of the earth, and civilization would certainly taste bitter without them.

DENNIS GRAY STOLL

Capital Punishment: A Case for Abolition. By MANNES TIDMARSH, J. D. HALLORAN, K. J. CONNOLLY. (Owlbooks. Sheed and Ward, London and New York. 174 pp. Diagrams. 1963. 10*s.* 6*d.*)

This book by three Roman Catholic authors — a priest, a sociologist and a psychologist — sets out a carefully argued case for the abolition of capital punishment in Britain on strictly rational grounds. Eschewing all emotionalism, the authors seek to show that there is no conclusive evidence that the death sentence is either necessary for the protection of society or effective as a deterrent; the onus of proof, they maintain, is therefore on the retentionists.

The illogicalities of the 1957 Homicide Act — the first "reform" in England since 1932 — under which four or five murderers are still executed each year, are exposed in all their absurdities. The findings of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, quoted here together with statistical evidence collected by a number of independent research workers, seem to sustain the authors' view that the murder rate is unaffected by the death penalty; that murderers are rarely "criminals" in the usual sense, a high proportion of them suffering from some mental abnormality; and that the retention of capital punishment undoubtedly owes something to an element of sadism in public opinion. The abolition of capital punishment would not only remove an injustice but would also bring positive benefits by directing more attention to methods of treatment of the psychopathic personality.

MARGARET TIMS

The Nature of Life. By C. H. WADDINGTON (Unwin Books No. 38. 128 pp. With Diagrams. 6*s.*); *Plato Today.* By R. H. S. CROSSMAN (Unwin Books No. 39. 192 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*); *The Life and Work of D. H. Lawrence.* By HARRY T. MOORE (Unwin Books No. 41. 250 pp. 8*s.* 6*d.*); *Release From Nervous Tension.* By DAVID HAROLD FINK (Unwin Books No. 42. 208 pp. 7*s.* 6*d.*); *Vedanta For The Western World.* Edited and Introduced by CHRISTOPHER ISHERWOOD (Unwin Books No. 43. 271 pp. 9*s.* 6*d.*); *Animal Navigation: How Animals Find Their Way About.* By J. D. CARTHY (Unwin Books No. 44. 143 pp. With Diagrams. 6*s.*) (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London. 1963).

These valuable paperbacks continue their selection of books that have made the grade in the past, for the benefit of discerning readers today. Waddington's *The Nature of Life* shows the current trend towards the synthesis of knowledge, fusing biology, chemistry, and sociology into one subject, and even reaching into philosophical questions on consciousness and free will. In his comprehensive *Animal Navigation,* Carthy concludes that the mysterious cases described can be reasonably explained by the animal kingdom's hypersensitivity of normal senses in some directions. Dr. Fink's *Release From Nervous Tension* is most constructive in its practical common sense. One could wish that today's victims of stress would take its advice to heart rather than rush into the delusive "tranquillizer-stimulant" habit. The public image of the author of *Lady Chatterley's Lover* has been so caricatured by notoriety that a more bal-

anced biography, like Moore's *Life and Work of D. H. Lawrence*, is needed by which to judge him more fairly, even though the conviction may still remain that his worship of instinctual life leads off the real track. Crossman's *Plato Today*, first published in 1937, with its somewhat prejudiced portrait of Plato as a "politician *manqué*," visiting Europe, fantasy-wise, in the 1930's to evaluate the then current trends, naturally dates. But it still affords many stimulating and pertinent jumping-off points for questions about present political, educational and social problems. This concern for mundane affairs is balanced by *Vedanta For The Western World*, in which a galaxy of contributors, both well-known Western writers and Eastern *swamis*, present the essence of Hindu wisdom. This was a pioneer book in the post-war increase of interest in Eastern philosophy and religion, as a faith to be lived, and not merely as a museum exhibit. It remains a standard work in its field.

L. MARR

The Commonplace Book 1919-1953. By GEORGE EDWARD MOORE. Edited by CASIMIR LEWY. (The Muirhead Library of Philosophy. George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., London. vii+411 pp. 1962. 42*s*.)

This book is as its title says. It does not elaborate for communication any one theme, but rather it brings us into contact with a philosopher as he largely reflects for himself according as he has been recently stimulated by conversation or reading in fields of thought obviously inexpugnable from his mind. These fields of thought are primarily logical, linguistic, and psychological, and here he keeps returning to such topics as — to choose some at random — "Pleasure and Pain," "Language," "Sense-data," "Universals," "Abstract Universals," "Entailment," "Propositions and Sentences," "Propositional Functions," "Is 'believe' always Dispositional?" and so on. The book is divided into nine notebooks. The first has thirty-five notes, the eighth only eleven. Likewise the notes vary considerably in length. For example, Notebook I. 34, on "Sense-data and Physical Objects" has five pages, and this is immediately followed by another note with the same title of two pages and a bit. (The same title again appears for Notebook V, 4, which has one page and a bit. The term "sense-data" appears further in Notebooks I, 25; III, 4, 13; IV, 10. This is simply one example among many of how with a splendid integrity Moore keeps worrying about a question, even about, as it might sometimes appear to some, an intellectual minutia. The chronological order of the Notebooks shows his persistent concern). As to the varying length of the notes, I should like to quote Notebook II. 15, which occupies the whole of page 109:

VICIOUS INFINITE SERIES

Are those only which arise from a circular definition. E.g. "is good"="is judged to be good."

The book ends with a note on Free Will of one and a quarter pages. Its opening paragraph is as follows:

My will is free if & only if both (1) *if* I had *chosen* (or *decided*) to make a "voluntary movement" which I did not make, I should have made it; and (2) I *could* have *chosen* (or *decided*) to make it.

The index of Proper Names points to the distinguished intellectual company which actually or imaginatively Moore constantly has for his enrichment. Here Bertrand Russell dominates. A considerable way down, W. E. Johnson and L. Wittgenstein tie for second place. From the rest of the names mentioned it would be invidious to select. Through-

out, as he philosophizes on this and that in the company of rigorous thinkers, Moore shows that he means by philosophy little else than rigorous thought on the nature of rigorous thought — on the assumptions, the implications, the psychological accompaniments, the linguistic vehicles of rigorous thought. We have not to look in the present volume for luminosities on such old-fashioned philosophical questions as those concerned with fundamental reality or objective good. In philosophy according to Moore, the this and that on which there has to be rigorous thought have to be themselves little else than the properties and accidents of rigorous thought.

M. KAYE

An Outline History of the Indian People. By H. R. GHOSAL. (Publications Division. Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi. 140 pp. 1962. Rs. 3.00)

It is a task of considerable magnitude to compress into the space of a mere forty-five thousand words the history of this ancient land, but this book, which was adjudged the best in a competition announced by the Ministry of Education, has succeeded admirably in its purpose.

A wealth of information is packed into its small compass, and several little points, hitherto not generally known, are mentioned; as for instance the fact that the early popularity of the theatre in India was due to Greek influence.

Many great sons of India figure in these pages, warriors and statesmen, artists and philosophers, all receiving their just measure of praise. A special tribute is paid to that devoted social reformer, founder of the Brahmo Samaj, Raja Rammohan Roy, who is fittingly referred to as "the bright morning star of the modern Indian renaissance."

A valuable publication, necessitating much historical research, this volume gives the general reader, for whom it is meant, an accurate outline of the intellectual as well as the social evolution and development of the people of India.

ROSHAN KOTHAVALA

Civil Aviation in India. (The Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, Delhi. 52 pp. 75 *naye paise.*)

The story of aviation is indeed the realization of a dream, and expresses the dauntless spirit of man in his attempt to master the skies.

This pamphlet classifies the progress of civil aviation in India into three periods. Firstly, the pioneering one; then the important stage during World War II, when not only internal but international airlines were established in India. The last stage marks the tremendous progress in civil aviation which has taken place since Independence and which has put India in the enviable position of having the largest network of air services in Asia.

This slim pamphlet is packed with statistical information.

ROSHAN KOTHAWALA

LEAVES FROM A MUNICH DIARY

[Few people would associate the Knights Templar with anything more recent than *Ivanhoe*. **Shri Baldoon Dhingra** tells us of how that Order lives on, in a changed and deepened way, even today. — Ed.]

It was Gary Vogel, a young and highly serious American student at Munich University, who first introduced me to the Templar Order. Through him, the Superior, Father Yohannes, sent me an invitation to spend any length of time in the monastery. So on my way from Ljubljana, a good deal out of curiosity, I stayed three days in an atmosphere full of warmth, good humour, and infectious laughter. I knew I had to come back to continue my talks so well begun, with Father Yohannes and the Prior, Dom Cyrillos, in French and English, as the case may be, to find out more about this Order, which my history told me and the knowing ones insisted was long extinct.

As an official Order, this is the only one of its kind in the world, and it was only in 1945 when the War ended that it came out of obscurity into what for it was limelight. In 1937, when Hitler reduced to pulp and powder all opposition, the Templars, now that the mystic Order had come out into the open, were taken for spies and promptly, to scotch them, put into the army. The Superior survived his leg wound and the City of Munich, in the American Zone, allowed an ancient building, shrouded with trees, close to a strip of a river, to be used as the monastery. In this ancient building, then, a dozen monks and nuns and a few novices began to live a life of contemplation and of action, a real inner and outer life, the inner to fortify them to tackle the problems of the world without; for how can one separate the two?

The Knights Templar have never ceased to be knights. In the Middle Ages they fought as knights to defend the weak; they fought a crusade for the sake of their religion. That is what appeared to them to be right, and they grew rich, these knights, and riches brought ruin in their train. Riches always do. I recall Goldsmith's words:

> Ill fares the land to hastening ills a prey
> Where wealth accumulates and men decay.

The Knights Templar who helped pilgrims on their way to Jerusalem and who fought the Saracens grew rich, and often their chivalry was chivalry in name only: courtesies and kindnesses were not "little, nameless acts of love"; they had to be paid for. As a consequence the Knights grew rich and powerful and the King of France thought he could use their wealth once he had destroyed their power, which he did, by putting them to the sword and otherwise persecuting them on every pretext by insisting that the Pope declare the Templar Order illegitimate. From that time on many inhumanities were inflicted upon the Knights; nor were they spared by the Saracens.

And so these Knights, the rich as well as the lowly, went underground and their suffering taught them the meaning of Jesus's words: "Blessed are the poor in spirit" and "It is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle. . . ."

The extraordinary thing is this: such is Father Yohannes's critical sense that he is not indulgent with those who have wantonly strayed from the path of righteousness, to become soldiers with weapons, to fight with fire and sword, rather than become soldiers of peace fighting injustice with love in the heart. A far more difficult thing to do, of course, and history has too often shown that might is invariably right unless

you are prepared to pay the price of right with your life. Yet the Templars, still a knightly order of monks, are soldiers in the sense that through self-discipline and courage they define their Order, as it was always intended, thus: this Order is founded to unite, to broaden, to defend, and to make holy our Mother Church, to protect widows and orphans and all needy creatures from wheresoever they come, and to protect from harm man, bird, and beast and to love and to take care of plants and flowers and all that lives. Even a chair or a carpet has its *raison d'être,* an existence all its own. All work, from dusting and washing to meditation and the giving of food, needs to be done as an act of love. There is no compulsion in this, no force, no coercion. Everything from feeding the needy and hungry — on wholesome vegetarian diet — begins with duty and ends with the widening of one's own horizon. None of the monks and nuns are confined, so to say, to the cloister. They have each of them their allotted tasks — the Prior is a dentist of excellence; a young monk goes to the market to fetch fresh vegetables, sometimes gifts; the little Sister cooks and pours love into her cooking, for there is infinite sweetness in all we eat — and the Superior is there always with his warmth and large-heartedness listening to different points of view, recognizing that the love of humanity has many facets, each making more lustrous the paths that lead to the summit.

If there is one word which best characterizes the Templar Monastery, it is "hospitality." "Charity" would be another, but it is a much misunderstood word and smacks a good deal today of patronage and pride. Hospitality, as the Templars show it, is blended with charity in its original form, *caritas*. Not only do a hundred people eat in the cloister each day; they are given, prepared with loving care, the food the monks eat — vegetarian, of course, a wholesome meal consisting of greens, porridge, *sautés* potatoes. The monotony is sometimes broken by introducing, as alternatives, macaroni, raw radishes, and sliced cucumber. On festive days some cheese can also be had and, from time to time, coffee.

Amongst the hungry people who come are often jailbirds, including pilferers. One of them, thinking it was silver, stole a tumbler. He returned it the following day, declaring it was plain brass. Upon being taken to task for abusing the Templar hospitality, he broke down and has been honest in the monastery ever since. But he disappears into prison from time to time. "It 's habit," he says.

It is over the dinner-table that the Superior is most eloquent and gracious. His flourishes, beginning with his bowing before the Great Black Madonna which dates back to the fifteenth century, are an art in themselves. The black robes cordoned at the neck and the medallions he wears give meaning to the obeisances as they jingle when they meet.

The cloister is an antiquarian's shop, full of every conceivable kind of *bric-à-briac,* icons, cups, saucers, carpets, lights, lamps, candlesticks, flowerpots, all jumbled together. There is almost a delicious disarray in the large rooms, which thus acquire a cheerful and colourful aspect denied to them because of the tall, thick trees which absorb whatever sunshine this mountainous region offers.

There is not an atom of grimness in the atmosphere. Prayer is meant to lighten the heart, to free it from the heaviness that surrounds. . . . There are times when the Herr Prior, Dom Cyrillos, after he has spent hours in the clinic, served food, visited patients, and done a hundred odd jobs, including preparing our bath — is very weary. A few nods of the head at the dinner-table and he is somewhat restored. But there is no restorative like sleep and these monks have little of it. They seem to

draw their sustenance from other sources of energy; they are replenished through their acts of giving.

The Chapel is alight with candles of all shapes and forms, and there is a warmth in the richly decorated and festooned room, filled with plants and creepers.

In talking to the Superior and the Prior I found they had studied, always with respect and reverence, so many of the scriptures of the world, especially the teachings of the Buddha, the *Gita*, and Ramakrishna, and were well aware of the synthetic approach of Theosophy.

If there is one thing that will make me hesitate to come here oftener, it is the cold. The large rooms cannot be easily heated and Munich, at the best of times, is a cold place, cold even in the summer; and huge trees shroud the monastery and the river a few yards away adds to the humidity.

It has been a privilege to meet the monks and the nuns and the other friends of the monastery, many of whom come here for dinner and are otherwise associated with the order, and I shall never forget the relaxed atmosphere that pervades the old building. There is no embarrassment here. The peace is the peace of strength, of joy given and joy received. Here is a combination of the Orient and the Occident. The Greek Orthodox Church, borrowing from other Eastern sources, has incorporated into itself the energy of the West and a good deal of the contemplation of the East. A happy blending.

BALDOON DHINGRA

ENDS AND SAYINGS

"————————*ends of verse*
And sayings of philosophers."
HUDIBRAS

Erich Fromm used the term "reification" to describe the contemporary fashion for treating human beings as mere objects — *res*, things in fact — to be handled just as materials and instruments are manipulated in industry and commerce.

The term could well be used to describe "Investment in Man," the presidential address of Sir Eric Ashby, Master of Clare College, Cambridge, to the British Association for the Advancement of Science, at Aberdeen, in August. He raised thought-provoking questions, but, significantly, the defining terms were those rather of machinery and finance than of education. He quoted Alfred Marshall, "that the most valuable of all capital is that invested in human beings," adding that the advancement of science could not be isolated from the whole process of civilization. The present educational opportunities were not enough to meet the future need for scientists and technologists, and existing schemes for integrating part-time education with employment were inefficient.

I do not advocate a colossal proliferation of universities in Britain. An indiscriminate inflation of the volume of investment in man would not pay off.

Simply increasing the number of places and degrees gained would benefit neither nation nor students. Increasing the volume of investment in man demanded also a change in its pattern,

the main difficulty in this being the shortage of university teachers. Should one maintain teaching quality at the cost of increasing the student-teacher ratio, or maintain the present ratio (10 to 1), by including mediocre staff? Can students be helped by working on their own with audio-visual aids?

Gadgets cannot replace the teacher when he is really engaged in education and not just instruction, for in teaching at the highest level there has to be a feed-back from the students to the teacher, to which the teaching is constantly adjusting itself.

It was no longer true to assume that a three-year undergraduate course was sufficient to set a man up for a lifetime. The present generation of students would find their qualifications (at any rate in science, technology, and social sciences) obsolete by the end of the century.

Our investment in the rest — the great majority of our human resources — will inevitably be devalued by technological and social change. Measures to combat obsolescence, therefore, become of prime importance.

Present measures were inadequate. The extra-mural Departments of Universities would need to provide far more sustained courses for re-education on a large enough scale, while employers would have to co-operate fully in releasing men, on full pay, for such courses every few years. Perhaps the time would come when a degree or professional qualification would be like a passport, valid only for a limited period, and requiring renewal by systematic re-education.

There must be general agreement with Sir Eric that education does not end with the gaining of a degree, but it is a pity when "re-ification" enters education. It is this psychological attitude towards workers in industry that is far more responsible for strikes, disputes, slackness, and general feeling against employers than any question of increases in pay or betterment of material conditions. Since every man is an individual free-willed being, responsive in different ways to the same environment, it seems belittling to lump them together simply as an investment for profit.

Innumerable are the "pairs of opposites" which we have not yet learned to treat as complementary. A less common aspect was illuminated by G. D. Klingopulos, Senior Lecturer in English at University College, Cardiff, Wales, in a paper read to the Cardiff Literary and Philosophical Society, and reprinted in shortened form in *Universities Quarterly* (June-August 1963) under the title "Literary Myth and Historical Fact."

Mr. Klingopulos wrote of the tendency of writers on aesthetics to oversimplify, since their favourite analogies between literature and the visual arts are, in fact, limiting. Words in literature should be seen rather as living plants. Furthermore, the moral quality in literature is intrinsic and not detachable. Its stimulus lies in "the sense of the irresistible reality of great works of literature." Every man in daily experience uses words "relevantly, descriptively, evocatively, effectively" while the "masters of language have concentrated their experience of living" in their works and represent their era as well as themselves.

Yet today people are too blind to the true nature of education. Serious reading is divided from evaluation. Historian and literary man meet at cross-purposes, each with his own bias. The former looks upon literature as "myth," negligible in factual value. The latter ignores facts and statistics in favour of the writer's own response and power of expression. The sensitivity to all experience of the Metaphysical poets like Donne and Traherne, and the allegorical tradition so freshly carried on by Bunyan, gave way, from the later seventeenth century, to rationalized and ele-

gant verse, and to a materialist scientific philosophy. The variance between the writer's and historian's picture of events can be seen by comparing the sad plaints about the nineteenth-century "industrial revolution" by writers like Carlyle, Kingsley, and Tennyson with the economic historian's portrait of the same period, "the age of improvement." Was the fall of the worker's standard of living, and loss of interest in work, fact or fiction? What facts has the historian about the strongly marked literary tradition that complete urbanization had drastic moral results, obliterating in so many people the relationship between man and nature, and making man "the prisoner of his own improvements."

The lecturer seemed to incline towards literature, since he quotes Aristotle's reference to the poet as seer and prophet, who takes external facts, but explores their implications, and thus expresses the universal. The historian represents the particular. Literary and historical studies, Mr. Klingopulos concluded, are complementary, but their "genuine collaboration" has not been achieved. Perhaps, we ourselves might add, the cause lies in the failure to recognize that, in the primal "pair of opposites" (Spirit-Matter), it is Spirit that directs, using Matter as essential vehicle. Today, we strive largely for material ends, and leave Spirit largely as an abstraction.

The "Freedom March" of the Negro civil-rights movement to the Lincoln Memorial in Washington on 28 August 1963 was a happily successful gesture in which about 200,000 people took part. It is noteworthy that there was no violence. As the London *Guardian* commented in an editorial (30 August 1963):

> No better way could be found to dramatize the absurdity and injustice of racial segregation, particularly when the obvious sanity and dignity of the Negro marchers are contrasted with the hysteria and violence which have marked so many Southern demonstrations in favour of white supremacy. . . . The roots of racial discrimination are moral and psychological, and moral and psychological methods are best fitted to weed it out.

The comment continued that this march was more likely to be effective than those of the unilateralists of the Peace Movement in Britain, since the latter's appeal is primarily one of logic, whereas race discrimination is rooted in emotions, against which argument is unavailing. One can remember that the Negro civil-rights movement has taken its inspiration, under the guidance of figures like Martin Luther King, from the Sermon of the Mount and Gandhi's teachings of *ahiṃsā* and non-violence.

Matters have still to be worked out in the practical field, and there are difficulties ahead. Yet President Kennedy is endeavouring to come to grips with them, in pushing the necessary legislation through Congress; and all who hope and work for brotherhood, in whatever sphere they may be, must send good wishes that the Negroes will achieve, not merely equal citizenship rights, but an acceptance in true equality as human souls.